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Abstract—Adequate ac power is required for decay heat removal4
in nuclear power plants. Station blackout (SBO) accidents, there-5
fore, are a very critical phenomenon to their safety. Though de-6
signed to cope with these incidents, nuclear power plants can only7
do so for a limited time, without risking core damage and possi-8
ble catastrophe. Their impact on a plant’s safety are determined9
by their frequency and duration, which quantities, currently, are10
computed via a static fault tree analysis that deteriorates in ap-11
plicability with increasing system size and complexity. This paper12
proposes a novel alternative framework based on a hybrid of Monte13
Carlo methods, multistate modeling, and network theory. The intu-14
itive framework, which is applicable to a variety of SBOs problems,15
can provide a complete insight into their risks. Most importantly,16
its underlying modeling principles are generic, and, therefore, ap-17
plicable to non-nuclear system reliability problems, as well. When18
applied to the Maanshan nuclear power plant in Taiwan, the re-19
sults validate the framework as a rational decision-support tool in20
the mitigation and prevention of SBOs.21
Index Terms—Accident recovery, Monte Carlo simulation22
(MCS), nuclear power plant, risk assessment, station blackout23
(SBO).24
NOTATIONS25
min (B) Least element of set/vector B.26
min{B,Q} Least element of B ∪Q.27
(B, i) ith element of set/vector B.28
ABBREVIATIONS29
AC Alternating Current.30
DC Direct Current.31
C Node capacity.32
CCF Common-cause failure.33
CCG Common-cause group.34
CS Cold standby state.35
F Failed state.36
LOOP Loss of offsite power.37
MCS Monte Carlo simulation.38
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S Shutdown state. 39
SBO Station blackout. 40
SU Start-up state. 41
TM Test/preventive maintenance state. 42
W Working state. 43
NOMENCLATURE 44
A System adjacency matrix. 45
C Component capacity vector. 46
c
{i}
x Capacity of component i in state x. 47
{c{i}x }M×1 Set of current capacities of all components. 48
Ei Set of attributes of component i. 49
e System edge matrix. 50
fl LOOP frequency. 51
fs SBO frequency. 52
fxy (t) Probability density function for transition from 53
state x to y. 54
G System graph object. 55
k Number of edges/links in system graph. 56
lb Set of minimum flow through edges/links. 57
M Number of system nodes. 58
m Number of safety buses/trains. 59
N Number of Monte-Carlo samples. 60
n1 Number of trains a generator can supply. 61
pn SBO probability given the (n− 1)th SBO. 62
ub Set of maximum flow through edges/links. 63
r Number of components affected by a CCF. 64
rn (t) Non-recovery probability from the nth SBO. 65
S Register indicating SBO occurrence. 66
s Set of source nodes. 67
sj SBO indicator for the jth simulation sample. 68
T Component transition matrix. 69
t ID of virtual output node. 70
Utm Unavailability due to test or maintenance. 71
u Proportion of train demand generator satisfies. 72
V Set of nodes in the system graph. 73
x0 Initial component state. 74
Xij Flow from node i to j. 75
Xout Flow into the virtual output node. 76
Y Set containing flows through all the nodes. 77
Θ System inequality constraint matrix. 78
Γ System incidence matrix. 79
Φ System equality constraint matrix. 80
Ωij Maximum flow from node i to j. 81
ð Number of intermediate nodes. 82
Ψ System flow objective function. 83
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ρ Set of components making up CCG.84
δ Number of components in CCG.85
θ Set of CCF probabilities.86
β1 Common failure mode for CCG.87
β2 State rendering CCG vulnerable to CCF.88
τ Vector of next node transition times.89
μold Vector of node capacities at last system jump.90
I. INTRODUCTION91
NUCLEAR power is produced by harnessing the heat gen-92 erated from a fission reaction chain in a reactor vessel.93
The reactor vessel is placed in a concrete containment to shield94
the environment from the potential release of radioactive mate-95
rials. Core damage ensues when the core temperature exceeds a96
certain threshold or the nuclear fuel elements in the vessel are97
uncovered. This event may trigger containment breach, inflict-98
ing huge environmental and economic catastrophe.99
Severe accident mitigation is achieved in part by ensuring100
a reliable cooling water circulation in the reactor vessel. This101
objective, during normal plant operation, is achieved through102
heat exchange between the primary and secondary loops of the103
plant’s main cooling system. The process, however, ceases on104
plant shut down and backup cooling systems are required to105
sustain decay heat removal. Like the main cooling system, the106
backup cooling systems rely on ac power provided by sources107
outside the plant (offsite power). When these sources fail (loss108
of offsite power—LOOP), emergency sources onsite are started,109
to drive the plant’s safety systems. If the emergency sources are110
also unavailable or unable to function as required, the plant111
is said to be in a station blackout (SBO). The backup cool-112
ing systems, however, are equipped with alternative turbine or113
diesel-driven pumps to help the plant cope with this incident.114
These systems, on the downside, require for monitoring and115
control, dc power from dc power banks. Their sustainability,116
therefore, regardless of their inherent reliability, is limited by117
the dc battery depletion time. This time, and the boil-off rate118
of reactor coolant, define the maximum acceptable ac power119
recovery duration [1].120
SBO accidents are the largest contributor to nuclear power121
plant risk, accounting for over 70% of the core damage fre-122
quency at some plants [1], [2]. LOOP events, which initiate123
these accidents, are classified on the basis of their origin. A grid-124
centred LOOP is due to the failure of the transmission network125
outside the plant, switchyard-centred LOOP arises from failures126
in the switchyard on the plant premises, plant-centered LOOP is127
triggered by the operational dynamics of the plant itself, while128
weather-related LOOP is attributed to failures induced by severe129
and extreme weather, excluding lightning [1], [2]. The effective130
SBO risk is the sum of the core damage frequencies induced by131
the various LOOP types.132
A. Review of Existing Models133
SBO risk quantification starts with a LOOP event tree analysis134
[3], where the emergency power system availability is checked135
in the first heading. This event failure, frequency of which de-136
fines the SBO frequency, transfers the analysis to the SBO event137
tree [1]. In the latter, the successes of the various mitigating ac- 138
tions, including offsite power and the recovery of the emergency 139
diesel generators (EDGs) at specific times are also checked. 140
These times, however, vary across plants and depend on the 141
status of a plant’s mitigating systems. At the Maanshan nuclear 142
power plant, for instance, power recovery is checked at 1, 2, 143
4, and 10 h into SBO. Each top event probability in the SBO 144
event tree requires one or more static fault trees [4]–[6] for its 145
quantification. 146
Static fault tree analysis employs an analytical approach, as 147
such, it carries the important advantage of being computation- 148
ally efficient. For this reason, its sensitivity, importance, and un- 149
certainty analysis capabilities are outstanding. These attributes 150
explain its wide use for risk analysis in the nuclear, aviation [7], 151
and chemical process industries [8]. Unfortunately, fault trees 152
become intractable with large systems or moderate systems with 153
complex interactions [8]. They often require a detailed knowl- 154
edge of the system being modeled, making them both difficult 155
to apply and error-prone. Their static nature also limits their 156
applicability in many ways. For instance: 157
1) Implementing certain types of interdependencies is either 158
tedious or completely impossible. 159
2) The analyst has to assume that SBO is coincident with 160
LOOP and that all power recovery efforts start simultane- 161
ously after SBO sets in. As a consequence: 162
a) The SBO frequency and nonrecovery probability 163
are overestimated in most cases, since the repair of 164
a failed element is normally initiated immediately. 165
b) For plants with multiple emergency power systems, 166
it is impossible to determine which sequence of re- 167
sponse minimizes the SBO frequency and maxi- 168
mizes the recovery probability simultaneously. 169
c) It is also difficult to investigate the effects of external 170
factors like logistic problems, extreme environmen- 171
tal events, and human resource constraints on the 172
recovery process. 173
3) The analyst is forced to assume the nonoccurrence of 174
a second SBO after power recovery. This assumption, 175
however, loses its validity if the emergency sources are 176
recovered first. In this case, a second failure could initiate 177
another SBO sequence before offsite power recovery. 178
4) Finally, there is the problem of inconvenience due to repet- 179
itive modeling. Since the nonrecovery probability is nor- 180
mally required for multiple instances, each would require 181
a dedicated fault tree. 182
There are numerous instances of remarkable attempts at ex- 183
tending the applicability of fault trees to systems with interde- 184
pendencies and various forms of dynamic interactions [6], [9]. 185
Kaiser et al. [10], for instance, introduced a state/event fault tree 186
approach that translates fault-trees to deterministic and stochas- 187
tic petri nets. Similarly, Zhou and Zhang [11], quite recently, 188
proposed an approach that converts static fault trees to dynamic 189
uncertain causality graphs in order to tackle the dynamic and un- 190
certainty attributes of practical engineering systems. However, 191
like Kaiser’s approach [10], Zhou’s [11] is restricted to binary- 192
state components and systems. Even though the performance 193
of most components could be partitioned into two levels, the 194
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existence of multiple failure modes makes binary-state models195
inadequate. Also, from a modeling perspective, there are oc-196
casions when the analyst would need to model a binary-state197
element as a multistate one in order to fully define its behav-198
ior. Such flexibility requires a framework supporting multistate199
modeling. Bobbio et al.’s fault tree to Bayesian Network map-200
ping procedure [12] effectively solve this problem. However,201
like Kaiser’s and Zhou’s approaches, Bobbio’s mapping pro-202
cedure is also susceptible to deficiencies (3) and (4) outlined203
above.204
Dynamic fault trees [13]–[16] are perhaps the closest re-205
searchers have come to solving the limitations of static fault206
trees. Various approaches have been proposed for their solution207
but Markov analysis [14], [15], [17] remains the most popu-208
lar. Markov modeling, however, like static fault tree analysis,209
becomes intractable with large systems and is only applicable210
to exponentially distributed transitions. Nevertheless, state ex-211
plosion is no longer an issue, with the introduction of intuitive212
dynamic fault tree software [18], [19]. Even with these devel-213
opments, most of the dynamic fault tree solution approaches214
are susceptible to deficiencies (3) and (4) outlined above. These215
deficiencies can only be addressed by approaches offering the216
flexibility to replicate the exact behavior of the system. Such an217
approach, however, was put forward by Rao et al. [16], which218
they used to model the power supply system of a nuclear power219
plant. The approach simulates a system’s dynamic fault tree and220
addresses most of the limitations of static fault trees. However,221
like the majority of system reliability models, Rao’s work is222
only applicable to binary-state components. The development of223
a more universal simulation framework, therefore, is desirable.224
B. Proposed Approach and Scope225
As evidenced in Rao et al.’s [16], Rocha et al.’s [20], and Lei226
et al.’s [21] works, Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) is flexible227
enough to model any system attribute. Its problem, however, is228
that most of the existing MCS algorithms are system-specific229
and require either the structure function, cut sets, or path sets of230
the system. An intuitive event-driven MCS procedure, offering231
multistate component modeling opportunities has recently been232
proposed [22]. This procedure is general and does not require the233
definition of the system’s path and cut sets or structure function,234
thanks to its embedded graph model.235
In this work, the graph and multistate models proposed in236
[22] are adopted. The graph model is used to model the topol-237
ogy of the system and allow the performance of the system to238
be directly computed from the performance of the components.239
This attribute eliminates the need for an explicit association of240
component failure combinations to the state of the system. The241
multistate model, on the other hand, is used to model the behav-242
ior of the components, overcoming the assumption of a perfectly243
binary behavior of components. It is particularly useful to the244
multiple failure mode and dynamic attribute representation of245
the emergency power systems. This model, for instance, could246
be exploited to investigate the effects of limited maintenance247
teams or the unavailability of spares on the emergency power248
systems recovery [23]. We extend the original model to incorpo-249
rate interdependencies by means of a dependency matrix and an250
efficient recursive algorithm to propagate the effects of failures 251
across the system. Completing the framework, we propose a 252
simple MCS algorithm that induces LOOP in the system, repli- 253
cate the ensuing sequence of events, and monitor the availability 254
of power at the various safety buses. The number of available 255
safety buses, as a function of time, is computed after each sys- 256
tem event. From the simulation history, any SBO index can be 257
computed, thereby providing an opportunity for more insights 258
into SBO risks. The multistate component model, together with 259
the dependency matrix, adequately captures and represents the 260
redundancies in the emergency power system of the plant. Con- 261
sequently, the explicit modeling of these redundancies, which 262
poses a significant challenge, is eliminated. 263
1) Merits and Novelty of the Proposed Approach: The 264
framework, for now, is limited to grid and switchyard induced 265
LOOP, given their dominance [2]. Its preliminary results were 266
first presented at the 13th Probabilistic Safety Assessment and 267
Management conference [24]. However, this paper proposes 268
several improvements. First, an extensive review of the suitabil- 269
ity of fault trees and their derivatives, to SBO analysis has been 270
included. We have also considered the effects of common-cause 271
failures (CCF), unavailability due to test or maintenance, and 272
human error on the SBO frequency and recovery probability. We 273
also show how the results obtained from the framework can be 274
absorbed in the existing model. Finally, we extend the number 275
of computable SBO indices and consider the effects of system 276
configuration and the sequence of operator response on system 277
recovery. 278
This paper is the first documented application of load-flow 279
simulation to a complete SBO risk assessment. With respect 280
to the existing models discussed in Section I-A, the proposed 281
framework exhibits the following advantages: 282
 Adequacy and Flexibility: It models realistic attributes of 283
the plant’s power recovery and provides more insights into 284
SBO risks. For instance, it enhances the investigation of 285
the possibility of a second SBO after the first. 286
 Convenience and Generality: It is convenient in the sense 287
that the modeler does not need to deduce the combination 288
of component failure leading to system failure. They also 289
do not need to explicitly model component redundancies, 290
as these are implicitly captured by the modeling frame- 291
work. The modeling framework, in addition, is applicable 292
to many system reliability problems. 293
2) Solution Sequence: The proposed approach is applied as 294
summarized by the following chronological steps: 295
 Identify the key elements of the system, define its topology, 296
and derive its flow equation parameters. 297
 Develop the multistate model for each system element. 298
 Model the interdependencies between the elements. 299
 Force a LOOP event and simulate the behavior of the 300
standby power systems. 301
 Compute the SBO indices from the simulation history. 302
II. SBO MODELING 303
A nuclear power plant’s power system consists of the grid, 304
the switchyard, the emergency power systems, alternative emer- 305
gency power system, and the safety buses. The alternative 306
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emergency power systems are additional emergency sources307
[such as gas turbine generators (GTGs)] available at some plants308
to boost their LOOP/SBO recovery capability. In this section,309
we show how the plant’s power system is accurately modeled310
and analyzed, in line with the solution sequence outlined in311
Section I-B2.312
A. System Topology313
We represent the topology of the plant’s power system by314
a graph nodes of which depict the components of the system.315
Connecting the nodes are perfectly reliable links portraying316
the direction of power flow. Flows from all the safety buses317
are terminated on a virtual node, introduced to represent the318
total available power. This virtual node would later be used to319
compute the nonrecovery probability of ac power.320
Let the nodes of the system be numbered from 1 to M and321
represented by the set V = {1, 2, . . . ,M}. Since the links are322
perfectly reliable, the adjacency matrix, A, of the system is323
defined as324
A = {aij}M×M | aij =
{
1 If flow is i → j
0 Otherwise. (1)
The topology of the system, therefore, can be defined by G |325
G = (V,A). Using the parameters of G only, the flow equations326
of the system can be derived [22]. These equations can then be327
used in synergy with the current state properties of the system328
nodes to deduce the performance of the system. For this, a linear329
programing algorithm is employed, given the possibility of flow330
redirection and the need to satisfy the capacity constraints of331
the nodes and their links. The objective is to find the flow across332
each link of the system that maximizes the flow into the virtual333
node. If Xij is the flow across the link between nodes i and334
j and given there are k such links for all (i, j) ∈ e, where e335
is the edge matrix of the system as defined in [22], the linear336
programing problem is formulated by (2), (5), (7), and (8)337
Θ{Xij}k×1 ≤ {c{i}x }M×1 | (i, j) ∈ e ∀i ∈ V. (2)
Equation (2) expresses the inequality constraints to be satisfied,338
where c{i}x denotes the capacity of node i when residing in state339
x. {c{i}x }M×1 , therefore, is the vector of current capacities of all340
the nodes of the system. The inequality matrix, Θ, is related to341
the incidence matrix, Γ, as follows:342
Θ = {θiq}M×k | θiq =
{
1, γiq = 0
0, otherwise (3)
Γ = {γpq}M×k | γpq =
⎧⎨
⎩
1, p = i
−1, p = j
0, otherwise.
(4)
Γ is related toA by (4), where q = 1, 2, . . . , k (the edge number)343
is the index of the edge between nodes i and j in e and p =344
1, 2, . . . ,M345
Φ{Xij}k×1 = {0}ð×1 ∀(i, j) ∈ e. (5)
Equation (5) expresses the equality constraint to be satisfied, 346
where Φ and Γ are related, thus 347
Φ = {φλq}ð×k | φλq = γpq
λ = 1, 2, . . . ,ð | ð < M f : λ → p ∀p ∈ (s ∪ t)′. (6)
ð is the number of intermediate nodes, s is the set of source 348
nodes, which comprises the grid and standby power systems, 349
while t is the virtual node representing the total output of the 350
system. If the intermediate nodes of the system (i.e., nodes not in 351
s and t) are arranged in ascending order of their ID, (6) suggests 352
the λth row of Φ is identical to the pth row of Γ, where p is the 353
λth element of the ordered set of intermediate nodes. In other 354
words, Φ is a submatrix of Γ, containing all the rows of the 355
latter corresponding to intermediate nodes 356
lb = {0}k×1 , ub = {Ωij}k×1
Ωij = min{c{i}max, c{j}max} ∀(i, j) ∈ e. (7)
Equation (7) defines the lower and upper bound vectors, lb and 357
ub, of the flow through the links, where c{i}max is the maximum 358
capacity of node i. Finally, the objective function of the linear 359
programing problem is expressed as 360
Ψ = −{ψq}1×k{Xij}k×1 | ψq =
∑
i∈s
γiq . (8)
Following the termination of the linear programing algorithm, 361
the vector of flow, Y, through the nodes of the system is given 362
by ΘM×k{Xij}k×1 . The total output, therefore, is given by the 363
tth element, (Y, t), of Y. Interestingly, all the parameters, but 364
{c{i}x }M×1 , required to compute Y remain static during system 365
simulation. The main task, therefore, is to update {c{i}x }M×1 af- 366
ter each system event. The derivation of (2) to (8) is outside the 367
scope of this paper, interested readers are referred to [22]. How- 368
ever, an illustrative example of the linear programing problem 369
formulation is provided in the Appendix of this paper. 370
B. System Components 371
Each component is defined by a multistate model that takes 372
into account the various parameters that characterize its opera- 373
tion. Let Ei denote component i, then 374
Ei = (T,C, x0) (9)
T = {Txy}n×n | x = y (x, y) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
Txy =
⎧⎨
⎩
∞, If x → y is a forced transition
0, If no transition between states x and y
fxy (t), Otherwise
(10)
where T is the transition matrix of the component; C | C = 375
{cx}1×n is the capacity vector; x0 is the initial state; cx is the 376
capacity in state x; n is the number of states; and fxy (t) is the 377
probability density function characterizing the transition from 378
state x to y. T contains the density function objects for all the 379
transitions depicted in the multistate model of the component 380
and C defines the capacity of the component in each state. 381
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Each state capacity is expressed as a nondimensional num-382
ber defining the proportion of total system output the node can383
supply or transmit while residing in that state. If m is the total384
number of power trains at the plant, n1 , the number of power385
trains the node simultaneously supplies, u, the proportion of386
power train demand it can satisfy, then, its capacity when work-387
ing perfectly is, n1um−1 . It expresses the total system output as388
a fraction of the number of power trains/safety buses present at389
the plant. On this note, the grid and switchyard nodes are each390
assigned unity capacity when available and 0, otherwise. The391
virtual output node has a fixed capacity of 1 and each safety bus,392
a fixed capacity of m−1 .393
1) Modeling the Grid and Switchyard: The grid is modeled394
as a two-state node: “Working,” when available and “Failed,”395
otherwise. Though grid failures are mostly random, we model396
them as forced transitions [23], since they already are incorpo-397
rated in the LOOP frequency. Most often, plants tap their ac398
power from multiple offsite sources, and grid failure is defined399
as the failure of all of these sources. The repair of at least one of400
the failed sources, however, is sufficient to achieve grid recov-401
ery. For this reason, the transition from “Failed” to “Working”402
is defined by the upper bound of the envelope around the cu-403
mulative density functions (cdf) of the individual source repair404
distributions. Given this, sampling the grid recovery time entails405
generating a uniform random number and reading off its corre-406
sponding time from the envelope cdf, interpolating where nec-407
essary. An important point to note is that this approach slightly408
underestimates the grid recovery probability, as it assumes the409
individual source repair actions are initiated concurrently. In410
practice, the sources do not necessarily fail simultaneously and411
their recovery actions may commence at different times. This412
implies, by the time the last source fails, the restoration of413
already failed sources would have begun. The actual grid re-414
covery time, therefore, is less than that given by the envelope415
cdf. This, however, is acceptable, as the goal in risk manage-416
ment is to ensure risk levels are acceptable, even in worst case417
scenarios.418
Similarly, normal switchyard operation is defined by a two-419
state node. In cases where the plant is enhanced with multiple420
switchyards, switchyard recovery is treated as in the case of421
multiple grid sources. Fig. 1 shows the multistate model for the422
grid and switchyard.423
2) Modeling the Standby Power Systems: The emergency424
power system is constituted by the EDGs, and in this work,425
GTGs constitute the alternative emergency power system. In this426
section, we model only the multistate behavior of the standby427
power systems, and the effects of redundancies on their oper-428
ation is considered in a latter section. We make the following429
assumptions in developing these models.430
1) The initiation of test/maintenance is coincident with431
LOOP, and at any instance, there is not more than one432
source in test or maintenance.433
2) Sources in test or maintenance remain unavailable through434
the sequence.435
3) Repairs are commenced immediately.436
4) A generator just from maintenance cannot fail to start.437
This implies a perfect maintenance scenario.438
Fig. 1. Multistate model for grid and switchyard nodes.
The alternative emergency power system recovery is assumed 439
offsite power recovery in [24]. This assumption is on the premise 440
that their failure is included in the LOOP frequency. However, 441
the assumption is impractical, given they are mostly a standby 442
source. We, therefore, modify their multistate model to include 443
running failures, rendering them an onsite source. 444
We consider failure-to-start and failure-to-run as the only fail- 445
ure modes an EDG is susceptible to. Failure-to-start refers to 446
the EDG failure to start from cold-standby and failure-to-run 447
denotes its failure to function for the duration of the LOOP. 448
While the former is defined by a crisp probability, the latter is 449
characterized by a time-to-failure probability density function. 450
However, the standardized plant analysis risk model [1] consid- 451
ers a third EDG failure mode, failure-to-load, defining the case 452
when the EDG starts but cannot power the load. This failure 453
mode is considered failure-to-start, in the proposed framework. 454
We introduce two additional states, “Working” and “TM,” as 455
shown in Fig. 2, to account for the perfect operation of the EDG 456
and its unavailability due to test or maintenance, respectively. 457
Except otherwise, the transition from cold standby to working is 458
instantaneous, while the transition from cold standby to failure 459
or TM is also instantaneous but conditional. Conditional tran- 460
sitions are a special type of forced transition depending on a 461
probabilistic event that is external to the component and with a 462
known likelihood [23]. Conditional and forced transitions have 463
the same representation in the transition matrix of the compo- 464
nent [see (10)]. 465
The GTGs behave in almost the same way as the EDGs, save 466
for the difference in their start-up and manual alignment times. 467
For this, a start-up state is inserted between their cold-standby 468
and working states, as shown in Fig. 2. While in start-up, they 469
could fail, explaining the transition from start-up to failure. 470
3) Accounting for Human Error: Human error is very im- 471
portant in the risk assessment of engineering systems. In SBO 472
recovery, human errors mostly manifest themselves as delayed 473
response to certain SBO mitigation action. For instance, the 474
switchyard is forced into a temporary shutdown state during grid 475
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Fig. 2. Multistate models for emergency diesel and GTGs without human error consideration.
Fig. 3. Multistate model for switchyard with human error consideration.
failures. On grid recovery, the plant personnel manually initiate476
its restoration, which process is susceptible to human-induced477
delays. Accounting for these delays, two additional states are478
introduced in the two-state model discussed in Section II-B1,479
as shown in Fig. 3. The transitions from “Working” to “Shut-480
down” and from “Shutdown” to “Delay” (D), are influenced481
by grid failure and recovery respectively. “Shutdown” denotes482
grid recovery-in-progress, while “Delay” represents switching-483
in-progress. The latter determines the difference between the484
potential and actual bus recovery times. If this difference is neg-485
ligible or the potential, instead of the actual bus recovery time486
is required, the model in Fig. 1 is retained.487
Similarly, the GTG and some EDGs require manual start-up488
and alignment, this is the case for shared diesel generators. A489
generator is said to be shared if it can substitute several units but,490
however, can only replace one unit at a given instance. There-491
fore, in the case of sequential multiple unit failures, only the492
first unit is replaced. For simultaneous failures, any of the units493
can be replaced, since they normally are identical. Since these494
replacements are manually executed, they are susceptible to de-495
lays, contrary to what most models suggest. Fig. 2, for instance,496
assumes the transition from cold standby to the fully functional497
or failure state to be instantaneous. This, by extension, implies,498
any maintenance action (if the generator fails to start) is initi- 499
ated at once. However, with human error, the start-up procedure 500
may be initiated later than scheduled. We, therefore, introduce 501
two states, one each, between cold standby and working and 502
failure and cold standby, as shown in Fig. 4, to account for these 503
delays. We have assumed the plant personnel to be well trained, 504
experienced, and fit to perform their assigned tasks as expected. 505
Consequently, the possibility of inappropriately executed ac- 506
tions is ignored. 507
Transitions 6 → 1 with 4 → 7 and transition 7 → 4 with 5 → 508
8, of Fig. 4, account for human error in the recovery of manually 509
operated emergency diesel and GTGs, respectively. In practical 510
applications, human error is expressed in terms of the probability 511
of not completing a given action within a specified time. If 512
this probability is known for multiple times, a cdf could be 513
fitted through the points. For this, we recommend the Weibull 514
distribution, since it can yield a wide range of distributions. 515
Recall the cdf of a Weibull distribution is 1− e−(t/a)b , where 516
a and b are its scale and shape parameters, respectively. Given 517
the human error probabilities are the likelihoods of inaction, 518
they define the complement of the human reaction time cdf. 519
Therefore, the Weibull parameters, a and b, are obtained by 520
fitting the set of probability values to the function e−(t/a)
b
. 521
C. Modeling Component Interdependencies 522
To ensure resilience, system designers often employ multi- 523
ple layers of defense, either in the form of redundancies or 524
shared components. This proactive strategy inadvertently intro- 525
duces interdependencies in the system, resulting in modeling 526
accuracy issues. We define interdependency in a more gen- 527
eral sense as the potential for a state change in one element 528
to trigger a state change in another. We propose two models, 529
the CCF and the cascading failure models, to implement these 530
interdependencies. 531
1) CCF Model: This model is used when the random failure 532
of any member of a group of similar components, performing 533
the same task could cause the failure of one or more of the 534
remaining components [25]. Such a group of components is 535
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Fig. 4. Multistate models for emergency diesel and GTGs with human error consideration.
called a common-cause group (CCG), and its key attributes are536
as follows:537
1) There is a set of probabilities associated with the num-538
ber of components involved in any random failure event.539
Let this set of probabilities be defined by θ | θ = {θr}δ ,540
where r is the number of components affected by the fail-541
ure event, δ, the total number of components in the group,542
and
∑δ
r=1 θr = 1.543
2) All the components in the CCG fail in the same mode.544
Implying, the CCG for start-up failures cannot influence545
the CCG for running failures, for instance.546
Each CCG, therefore, is defined by the quadruple,547
(ρ, β1 , β2 ,θ), where ρ is the set of components in the CCG,548
β1 , the common failure mode, and β2 , the state the components549
have to be in to be susceptible to this failure mode. The algorithm550
for propagating CCF is summarized thus.551
1) When a component fails, check if its new state matches552
β1 for its CCG.553
2) Go to step (v) if there is no match. Else, determine the554
number of components, r, that will fail.555
3) Go to step (v) if r = 1. Else, remove from ρ, the com-556
ponent initiating the failure event. From the remainder,557
randomly select r − 1 components.558
4) For each component selected in step (iii), check if its559
current state matches β2 and set this to β1 .560
5) End procedure.561
The procedure above requires θ to be in conformity with562
the α-Factor model [25]. CCF probabilities expressed in the563
multiple Greek letter model would need to be converted as564
in [25].565
2) Cascading Failure Model: This model is used for inter-566
dependencies not satisfying the CCF criteria. For instance, the567
redundancies among the standby power systems and the de-568
pendence of the latter on the grid and switchyard. An important569
assumption invoked in this model, however, is that on occurrence 570
of the trigger event, the dependent event occurs immediately. 571
Initially proposed in [26], the model defines interdependen- 572
cies by a dependency matrix. The dependency matrix, Di , for 573
node i, defines the effects of the node’s state transition on 574
other nodes. It takes the form, Di = {dj1 , dj2 , dj3 , dj4}v×4 | 575
j = 1, 2, . . . , v − 1, v, where dj1 is the state of i triggering the 576
event, dj2 , the affected node, dj3 , the state the node has to be in 577
to be vulnerable, and dj4 , its target state after the event. Each row 578
of Di defines the behavior of an affected node, and v, the num- 579
ber of relationships. For example, consider a two-component 580
system, with each component existing in three possible distinct 581
states. When component 1 makes a transition to state 3, compo- 582
nent 2 is forced to make a transition to state 2 as well, if and only 583
if the latter is currently residing in state 1. Since component 1 584
is the trigger component in this case, the interdependency is 585
defined by D1 as 586
D1 =
(
3 2 1 2
)
. (11)
Let a third three-state component be added to the system. In 587
addition to its effect on component 2, let the transition of 588
component 1 also affect component 3, such that the latter is 589
forced to state 1 if it is in state 3 at the time of the trigger event. 590
To represent the overall behavior of component 1, D1 is updated 591
as shown in (12), to reflect the new information: 592
D1 =
(
3 2 1 2
3 3 3 1
)
. (12)
(12) shows that each row of the dependency matrix represents a 593
possible outcome. 594
Occasionally, a state change in a node can only affect another 595
node if a third node is in a certain state. This type of dependency 596
is known as a joint dependency, and it is outside the scope of the 597
initial model in [26]. We introduce the joint dependency matrix, 598
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D′ = {d′j1 , d′j2 , d′j3 , d′j4}v×4 , to resolve this problem. Element599
d′j1 defines the state the third node must be in to satisfy the joint600
dependency, while d′j2 , d′j3 , and d′j4 have the same meaning as601
dj2 , dj3 , and dj4 , respectively. Assuming a certain state change602
in node i only affects, say node x, if node ω is in state σ,603
Di defines the relationship between nodes i and ω, while D′ω604
defines the relationship between ω and x. Nodes i, ω, and x are605
the trigger, intermediate, and target nodes, respectively. The606
intermediate node does not undergo a state change, meaning607
its target state is the same as its vulnerable state. Therefore, in608
Di , the third and fourth elements of the row corresponding to609
the intermediate node are equal. Given j = 1, for Di , d12 = ω,610
d13 = d14 = σ and for D′ω , d′11 = σ, d′12 = x. The remaining611
elements retain their meaning, as defined earlier. Let, for illus-612
trative purposes, the dependency between components 1 and 3613
(second row of D1 in (12)) only hold if component 2 is in state 2:614
D1 =
(
3 2 1 2
3 2 2 2
)
D′2 =
(
2 3 3 1
)
. (13)
To represent this attribute, the second row of D1 is modified615
to reflect the relationship between components 1 and 2, and the616
relationship between components 2 and 3, defined by D′2 as617
shown in (13). Notice D′2 , instead of D2 , has been used, since618
the relationship between components 2 and 3 is due to a joint619
dependency with another component.620
The dependency and joint dependency matrices, indeed, can621
be used to represent a wide range of dependencies. However,622
there are a few instances that may result in large matrices. Such623
cases require an intuitive manipulation, to keep the matrix size624
moderate and prevent modeling error. We introduce a negative625
sign in front of the trigger or vulnerable state to signify that626
the dependency is satisfied only if the component is not in that627
state. This notation is analogous to the NOT-gate in fault trees.628
For instance, if component 1, in the scenario above, can affect629
component 3 only if component 2 is in states 2 or 1, it is efficient630
to exploit the NOT notation, instead of inserting an additional631
row in each of D1 and D′2 . Recalling that component 2 has 3632
states, state 2 OR state 1 is logically equivalent to NOT state 3.633
Hence, the dependency matrices, D1 and D′2 , become634
D1 =
(
3 2 1 2
3 2 −3 −3
)
D′2 =
(−3 3 3 1 ) .
We propose a recursive algorithm to implement the depen-635
dency matrices. If xi denotes the new/current state of node i,636
the algorithm is summarized thus.637
i) Define a register, R, to hold the affected components,638
their vulnerable, and target states.639
ii) Using Di and xi , find all components affected by the640
state change and update R with elements 2 to 4 of the641
rows representing the components.642
iii) Select the last row of R and check if its last two elements643
are equal. This row defines the dependency induced in644
component ω by component i.645
iv) If the response to the query in step (iii) is in the affirma-646
tive, designate the equal elements, , delete the last row647
of R, and648
a) Using ω, D′ω , and xω as inputs, call steps (i) to 649
(vii), noting that a row in D′ω is affected by the 650
state change only if its first element is . 651
b) Continue from step (iii). 652
Else, proceed to step (v). 653
v) Force the designated transition as determined in step (iii) 654
and delete the last row of R. If the affected node is in 655
standby, and its target state, working, delay, or start-up, 656
initiate its start-up procedure. 657
vi) If Dω exists, repeat steps (ii) to (vi), replacing Di and 658
xi with Dω and xω , respectively. 659
vii) Repeat steps (iii) to (vi) until R is empty, and terminate 660
the procedure. 661
III. SYSTEM SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS 662
The system’s operation is imitated by generating random fail- 663
ure events of components and their corresponding repairs. For 664
every component transition, the capacity vector, {c{i}x }M×1 , of 665
the system is updated and used to deduce the flow, (Y, t), 666
through the output node. At time t = 0, the grid and switch- 667
yard nodes are in operation, while the emergency power systems 668
and alternative emergency power systems are in cold standby. 669
LOOP is initiated by setting the grid (for grid centred LOOP) 670
or the switchyard (for switchyard centred LOOP) to its failure 671
state. The next transition parameters of the standby systems are 672
sampled, and the simulation is moved to the earliest transition 673
time, t. Components with next transition time equal to t are 674
identified, the required transitions effected, their next transition 675
times sampled, the new system performance computed, and the 676
next simulation time determined. This cycle of events continues 677
until offsite power is recovered. 678
Let μold hold the node capacities at the previous system tran- 679
sition, τ , the vector of next node transition times, N , the number 680
of simulation samples, and S = {sj}N , the register indicating 681
the occurrence of an SBO. The indicator register, S, is such that, 682
sj = 1 if an SBO occurs in the jth sample, and 0, otherwise. 683
The simulation algorithm is summarized thus. 684
i) Initialize the register storing the flow through the out- 685
put node, set N = 1, S = {}, and define the simulation 686
stopping criterion. The stopping criterion could be the 687
number of LOOP, number of SBO, or convergence of 688
the SBO probability. 689
ii) Determine which component will be unavailable due to 690
test or maintenance. 691
iii) Set sN = 0 and τ = {∞}M , where M is the number of 692
nodes in the system. 693
iv) Force LOOP as described earlier, accounting for in- 694
terdependencies according to the procedures described 695
in Sections II-C1 and II-C2. Remember to sample the 696
next transition parameters after every node transition 697
and update τ . See [22] for the procedure for sampling 698
the transition parameters of a multistate node. 699
v) Define μ using the current states of the nodes, that is, 700
μ = {c{i}x0 }M×1 and set t = 0, μold = μ. 701
vi) Determine Xout | Xout = (Y, t) and save as a function 702
of time. 703
IEE
E P
ro
of
GEORGE-WILLIAMS et al.: PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT OF STATION BLACKOUTS IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 9
vii) Set sN = sN + 1 if Xout = 0 and determine the next704
simulation time, t = min (τ ).705
viii) Find nodes with next transition time equal to t. For706
each node, force the required transition, sample its next707
transition parameters (except for nodes returning to cold708
standby), and update μ and τ .709
ix) Restart nodes returning from repairs if Xout , as previ-710
ously determined, is less than 1.711
x) If μold = μ;712
a) Compute Xout and set sN = sN + 1 if Xout = 0.713
b) Save Xout if different from the previous.714
c) Temporarily set the capacity of the switchyard715
node to 1 if it is in “Shutdown” and calculate the716
new system flow. If this flow is nonzero, set the717
switchyard to start-up, sample its next transition718
parameters, and update τ .719
xi) Set μold = μ, t = min (τ ), and check if offsite power720
is recovered.721
xii) Repeat steps (viii) to (xi) until offsite power is recovered.722
Discard history N if sN = 0 and set N = N + 1.723
xiii) Repeat steps (ii) to (xii) until the simulation stopping724
criterion is met, and terminate algorithm.725
xiv) Compute the relevant SBO indices726
A. SBO Indices: Computation and Relevance727
The SBO frequency, fs , makes the list of the most informative728
and desired SBO indices. It defines the expected number of729
times, per year, an SBO occurs at a plant. If p1 defines the730
conditional probability of an SBO given a LOOP occurring at731
frequency, fl , per year, then732
fs = p1fl
p1 =
∑
(S > 0)
N − 1 . (14)
The fraction of fs occurring at start-up is deduced from the733
number of SBO at time 0. This index could be used to assess the734
efficiency of the start-up procedure, as well as the vulnerability735
of the generators in cold standby.736
The nonrecovery probability, r1 (t), defines the likelihood of737
recovery duration from an SBO accident exceeding a given time.738
It is computed as detailed in [26], and like p1 , belongs to the set739
of inputs to the SBO event tree. Given it defines the unavailabil-740
ity of power at the plant, r1 (t) can be directly compared with741
the reliability of the SBO mitigating mechanism. The outcome742
of such a comparison would help ascertain the adequacy of the743
mitigating mechanism. In addition, fs × r1 (t) yields the fre-744
quency of exceedance, a measure of the overall SBO risk at the745
plant. The quantity also presents a means of assessing the rela-746
tive effectiveness of multiple recovery responses or operational747
constraints.748
Finally, the conditional probability of a second SBO, p2 , given749
an SBO has already occurred is given by750
p2 =
∑
(S > 1)∑
(S > 0)
. (15)
Knowledge of p2 may shape the recovery response on the oc- 751
currence of a second SBO. For instance, a plant with a large p2 752
would require the logistics used in the recovery of the first SBO 753
left in the field and the operations staff kept on high alert. This 754
reduces human error, ensuring a lower nonrecovery probability, 755
r2(t), of the second SBO. 756
Generally, the conditional probability, pn , of the nth SBO 757
given the (n− 1)th SBO is expressed as 758
pn =
∑
(S > n− 1)∑
(S > n− 2) . (16)
If absolute probabilities are required instead, the denominator 759
in (16) is replaced with N − 1. 760
B. Incorporation Into the Existing Framework 761
Shown in Fig. 5 is an excerpt from the SBO event tree pre- 762
sented in [1]. Of its 12 headings, only four T(PG), EM, ER1, 763
and ER2 are of relevance to SBO recovery. The first depicts 764
LOOP, and requires the LOOP frequency. The second repre- 765
sents SBO occurrence, and requires the unavailability of the 766
standby power systems. Here, the chain of complicated fault 767
trees in the existing model can be replaced with the conditional 768
SBO probability, p1 . The last two headings represent offsite and 769
standby power recovery, respectively. These can be merged into 770
one heading, say ac power recovery, and the complicated fault 771
trees replaced with a crisp value read from r1 (t). With these, the 772
core damage frequency induced by the first SBO is computed by 773
solving the event tree, using standard procedure. For the second 774
SBO, the first is regarded the initiating event. The LOOP fre- 775
quency, therefore, is replaced with fs , p1 with p2 , and r1 (t) 776
with r2(t). 777
IV. CASE STUDY: AN APPLICATION TO THE MAANSHAN 778
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT IN TAIWAN 779
The Maanshan plant is a two-unit, 1902 MW, Westinghouse 780
PWR nuclear power plant operated by the Taiwan Power Com- 781
pany. Its offsite power is supplied by six independent sources, 782
four of which are connected to the 345-kV switchyard and the re- 783
mainder, through the 161-kV switchyard. It is powered through 784
two safety buses, AIE-PB-S01 and BIE-PB-S01, each with a 785
dedicated EDG: DG-A, and DG-B, respectively. A shared EDG, 786
DG-5, connected as shown in Fig. 6 is available as a backup in 787
case any of the dedicated generators is unavailable. In addition 788
to the shared EDGs, are two GTGs, GT1 and GT2, connected 789
via the 161-kV switchyard. These generators form the alterna- 790
tive emergency power system of the plant, each satisfying the 791
demand on both power trains. 792
During normal plant operation, the safety buses are fed by 793
the main plant generator, G1, via the red lines and the normally 794
closed breakers 19 and 01. On plant shut down, G1 becomes 795
unavailable, and the safety buses are forced to tap power from 796
the 345-kV switchyard (via the blue lines and the normally 797
open breakers 17 and 03) or the 161-kV switchyard (via the 798
green lines and the normally open breakers 15 and 05). When 799
these sources also become unavailable, DG-A and DG-B are 800
automatically started and aligned. DG-5 is manually started and 801
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Fig. 5. Excerpt from the SBO event tree showing headings (credit: [1]).
Fig. 6. Layout of the Maanshan nuclear power plant ac distribution system (credit: Dr. S.-K. Chen, NTHU, Taiwan).
aligned by the plant operators on the failure of any of these. The802
manual start-up and alignment procedure of GT1 and GT2 is803
initiated when at least 2 out of the 3 EDGs become unavailable.804
Following their successful start-up, the GTGs take about 30 min805
to become fully functional.806
A probabilistic assessment of the SBO risk of the plant due807
to grid and switchyard initiated LOOP is required.808
A. Developing the System and Component Models809
Fig. 7 is the simplified schematic of the plant’s ac power810
system, showing all the elements relevant to an SBO. DG-5,811
though serving only one bus at a time, is assumed connected to812
both buses in the system’s adjacency matrix. This implies, its813
flow is divided between the buses, contrary to what is obtained814
in reality. However, since the flows from the two buses are815
emptied into the virtual output node, t, the total flow from the 816
shared generator is accounted for. As shown, the six grid sources 817
and the two switchyard sources have each been represented by 818
single nodes, as proposed in Section II-B1. 819
Nodes 1, 7, 8, and 9 are modeled as proposed in Sections II-B 820
and II-B1. The switchyard, on the other hand, is modeled ac- 821
cording to Fig. 3, to account for human error during its start-up 822
from shut down. Since DG-A (node 5) and DG-B (node 6) are 823
automatically started following a LOOP, they are not susceptible 824
to human error, and, therefore are modeled as shown in Fig. 8. 825
DG-5, GT1, and GT2, however, require human intervention for 826
their start-up and alignment. Node 10, therefore, is modeled 827
according to Fig. 9 and nodes 3 and 4, according to Fig. 10. 828
Justifying the values assigned to the state capacities of the 829
generators, recall the system consists of 2 safety buses (m = 2) 830
with each of DG-A and DG-B serving only one bus at a time 831
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Fig. 7. Simplified schematic of plant’s ac distribution system.
(n1 = 1). Since these generators can, however, fully meet the de-832
mand on the bus they serve (u = 1), they are assigned a capacity833
of 0.5 when working, as proposed in Section II-B. The GTGs,834
on the other hand, can fully serve both buses simultaneously835
(n1 = 2), and therefore, have a capacity of 1 when working.836
From the multistate models, the capacity vector for the main837
diesel generators, the shared diesel generator, and the GTGs are838
{0.5, 0, 0, 0, 0}, {0.5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, and {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},839
respectively. Using these parameters in conjunction with Fig. 7,840
the adjacency matrix of the system is derived as841
A =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
Given the adjacency matrix, the other parameters of the system842
flow equations are obtained as described in Section II-A, where843
s = {1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10} and t = 9. Fig. 11 is the system’s graph844
model showing the maximum flow along each link, derived from845
the adjacency matrix and the maximum node capacities.846
Component Reliability Data: Though realistic, the data used847
do not represent the actual data for the Maanshan plant. They848
were, however, assumed with the view to reflecting the reliability849
Fig. 8. Multistate model for the main diesel generators (DG-A and DG-B).
Fig. 9. Multistate model for the shared diesel generator (DG-5).
data used in Volumes 1 and 2 of the NUREG/CR-6890 report 850
(see [1] and [2]). 851
The repair times for the six grid sources are lognor- 852
mally distributed with means and corresponding standard de- 853
viations defined by {8.99, 11.84, 8.24, 10.25, 9.61, 9.15} and 854
{6.71, 4.83, 4.05, 6.61, 1.92, 5}, respectively. Similarly, switch- 855
yard repair times are lognormally distributed, with {8, 10.41} 856
and {5.83, 2.5}, respectively, being the sets of means and cor- 857
responding standard deviations for the two switchyards. The 858
effective repair distributions for the grid and switchyard nodes 859
are modeled according to the proposal in Section II-B1, as shown 860
in Figs. 12 and 13, respectively. 861
All five standby generators are assumed to have a start-up 862
failure probability of 1.756× 10−2 . Also, the human errors as- 863
sociated with the failure to complete the start-up procedures 864
for GT-5 and the switchyard are assumed equal but one-sixth 865
of those for GT1 and GT2. Table I defines the probability of 866
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Fig. 10. Multistate model for the GTGs (GT1 and GT2).
Fig. 11. Full system graph model showing maximum flow along links.
the operators not completing the start-up of the GTGs within867
selected times. Using the procedure proposed in Section II-B3,868
the parameters defining transitions 7 → 4 and 5 → 8 of the869
GTGs were obtained. The same procedure was used to obtain870
the parameters for transitions 6 → 1 and 4 → 7 of DG-5 and871
transition 4 → 1 of the switchyard. These and the parameters872
Fig. 12. Effective repair cdf for multiple grid sources.
Fig. 13. Effective repair cdf for multiple switchyard nodes.
for the remaining transitions are presented in Table II. The col- 873
umn, Utm, defines the unavailability due to test/maintenance of 874
the generators. The CCF parameters are defined by a set in 875
which each element represents the probability of a certain num- 876
ber of components being involved in any failure event initiated 877
by the component. The number of components is determined 878
by the index of the element in the set. For instance, from the 879
table, the probability that the start-up failure of any of the main 880
diesel generators leads to the failure of the other generator is 881
0.021. This implies a total of two component failures, explaining 882
why the probability value is the second element of the set (see 883
Section II-C1 for details). Transition 4 → 1 of the GTGs depicts 884
their start-up duration, which as we are told in Section IV, takes 885
30 min, explaining why it is assigned a deterministic 0.5 h. 886
B. Representing Component Interdependencies 887
The first and easily recognizable form of interdependency in 888
the system is CCF, where the failure of a generator could trigger 889
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TABLE I
HUMAN ERROR PROBABILITIES FOR GT1 AND GT2
TABLE II
COMPONENT RELIABILITY DATA
TABLE III
CCG DEFINITION
the almost instantaneous failure of another generator. This type890
of interdependency is modeled according to the CCF model891
presented in Section II-C1. DG-A and DG-B, as we know, are892
of the same design and model, different from the make of DG-893
5. Therefore, while the former are susceptible to CCF, DG-5894
is immune. Similarly, GT1 and GT2 are susceptible to CCF,895
giving rise to four CCGs, as defined in Table III. The table is896
developed from the CCF parameters in Table II in conjunction897
with the CCF model proposed in Section II-C1. CCG 1, for898
instance, represents the CCF due to the start-up failure of any of899
the main diesel generators. Since these generators are denoted900
as nodes 5 and 6 in the system, ρ, the set of components in the901
CCG is defined as {5, 6}. Now, as shown in Fig. 8, the start-up902
failure of DG-A or DG-B is denoted by state 4. Also, the other 903
generator could only be affected by this event if it is in cold 904
standby (state 3) at the time of occurrence. This explains why 905
β1 and β2 are assigned the values, 4 and 3, respectively. The 906
parameters for CCG 2 to 4 are derived in a similar fashion. 907
The other form of interdependency, like the grid failure ne- 908
cessitating the start-up of the standby generators or the failure 909
of GT-5 forcing the start-up of the GTGs, is a little more sub- 910
tle and difficult to deduce. It requires a good knowledge of the 911
operating principle of the system and cannot be modeled by 912
the CCF model. For this, the cascading failure model proposed 913
in Section II-C2 is invoked. To ensure the reproducibility of 914
the case study, the step-by-step procedure for developing the 915
IEE
E P
ro
of
14 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON RELIABILITY
dependency matrices have been shown by recreating the se-916
quence of events following a LOOP.917
1) Let us assume the occurrence of the initiating event918
(LOOP), due to the failure of the grid (node 1). As al-919
ready stated at the beginning of Section IV, the main920
diesel generators, A (node 5) and B (node 6), are restarted921
from cold standby. This is accounted for by the first two922
rows of the dependency matrix, D1 . However, if the main923
generators are not in cold standby, maybe924
D1 = D2 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
2 5 3 1
2 6 3 1
2 5 −3 −3
2 6 −3 −3
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
D′5 = D
′
6 =
(−3 10 3 6
−3 10 −3 −3
)
D′10 =
(−3 3 3 7
−3 4 3 7
)
(17)
due to test/maintenance or failure, the shared standby gen-925
erator, DG-5 (node 10), is restarted. Recalling the concept926
of joint dependency discussed in Section II-C2, the joint927
dependency between the grid and DG-5 can be deduced.928
Here, the main generators are the intermediate nodes,929
since they dictate whether or not to start the shared gen-930
erator. This behavior is jointly represented by the last two931
rows of D1 and the first row of D′5 in (17). Again, if the932
shared generator too is unavailable (i.e., it is not in cold933
standby), the GTGs, GT1 (node 3) and GT2 (node 4), are934
restarted (see Fig. 10). This attribute is jointly represented935
by D′10 and the last row of D′5 . If, however, the GTGs936
are not in cold standby on arrival of their start-up signal,937
no action is taken. This is due to the fact that the signal938
signifies the unavailability of all the standby sources at939
the plant. D′5 and D′6 are equal because nodes 5 and 6940
produce the same effect on the shared generator when un-941
available for start-up. Similarly, D1 and D2 are equal, as942
the response of the standby systems is the same for grid943
and switchyard failures944
D5 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
2 6 3 1
4 6 3 1
2 6 −3 −3
4 6 −3 −3
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ . (18)
2) DG-A (node 5) fails to start or starts but fails to run (see945
Fig. 2). The system will first check if DG-B (node 6) is946
available for start-up and initiate its start up, if available.947
This behavior is defined by the first two rows of D5 , as948
shown in (18). The effect of the unavailability of DG-B949
on arrival of its start-up signal has already been defined in950
scenario 1) (see the last row of D1). This representation is951
adapted to account for the case when DG-A fails to start952
or run and DG-B is unavailable for start-up, in the last two953
rows of D5 [see (18)] 954
D6 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
2 5 3 1
4 5 3 1
2 5 −3 −3
4 5 −3 −3
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ . (19)
3) Similarly, DG-B (node 6) fails to start or starts but fails 955
to run (see Fig. 8). The system will first check if DG-A 956
(node 5) is available, and initiate its start-up. The ensuing 957
sequence of events is similar to that in scenario 2). Hence, 958
the dependency matrix is as obtained in (19). 959
4) DG-5 in cold standby fails to start or starts but fails to run 960
(see Fig. 9). In this case, any repaired EDG is restarted 961
first, otherwise, the GTG are restarted. The ensuing pos- 962
sible sequence of events are already covered by scenarios 963
(1)–(3), and it is, therefore, recommended to not explicitly 964
redefine these in D10 , for simplicity. It is deducible that 965
the failure of DG-5 induces the same response sequence as 966
grid or switchyard failure. Therefore, recreating a LOOP 967
event accounts for the failure of DG-5. Hence 968
D10 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
2 1 2 2
2 2 2 2
4 1 2 2
4 2 2 2
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ D′1 = D1 D′2 = D2 .
5) GT1 (node 3) starts up successfully and enters the start-up 969
state (see Fig. 10). Recall, states 7 and 8 account for the 970
time taken by the operator to initiate the start-up of the 971
generator. However, since both GT1 and GT2 (node 4) 972
are in the same location, they are exposed to equal delays. 973
Hence, the transitions, 7 → 4 and 5 → 8, of GT1 and GT2 974
are equal. To ensure the satisfaction of this constraint, 975
when GT1 enters state 4, GT2 too is forced to state 4 if it 976
is in state 7 or state 8, if it is in state 5. Similarly, when 977
GT1 enters state 8, GT2 is forced to state 8 if it is in state 978
5 or state 4 if it is in state 7. This behavior is expressed by 979
the first four rows of D3 , as shown in (20). 980
6) GT2 (node 4) starts up successfully and enters the start-up 981
state (see Fig. 10). This scenario has the same effect on 982
GT1 (node 3) as scenario (v) has on GT2. Therefore, the 983
ensuing sequence of events is accounted for by the first 984
four rows of D4 , as shown in the following: 985
D3 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
8 4 5 8
8 4 7 4
4 4 5 8
4 4 7 4
2 4 3 7
2 4 2 2
2 4 8 8
2 4 5 5
2 4 6 6
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
D4 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
8 3 5 8
8 3 7 4
4 3 5 8
4 3 7 4
2 3 3 7
2 3 2 2
2 3 8 8
2 3 5 5
2 3 6 6
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
D′3 = D
′
4 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
2 1 2 2
5 1 2 2
6 1 2 2
8 1 2 2
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ . (20)
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TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF THE STATIC SBO INDICES OBTAINED
Fig. 14. Probability of SBO duration exceedance.
7) GT1 fails to run. GT2 is restarted, if it is available for986
start-up, otherwise the system checks whether or not the987
failed diesel generators have been repaired. The first case988
is represented by the fifth row of D3 , as shown in (20). The989
sequence of events involved in the second case is similar to990
the events following a LOOP. Therefore, a LOOP scenario991
is recreated, as shown in the last four rows of D3 and D′4 .992
States 1, 4, and 7 have been left out of the possible GT2993
states to necessitate the second case because, they mean994
either GT2 is already in operation (state 1), or on the verge995
of operation (states 4 and 7).996
8) Similarly, GT2 failure to run produces the same effect997
on GT1 and the diesel generators, as in scenario (7). The998
ensuing sequence of events is defined by D4 and D′3 .999
We have not considered the sequence of events following1000
the failure of the GTGs to start because, being the last standby1001
sources to be called into operation, their start-up failure means1002
the unavailability of the other standby sources.1003
C. Results and Discussions1004
The proposed framework is implemented in the open source1005
uncertainty quantification toolbox, OpenCOSSAN [27], [28],1006
and used to quantify the SBO risk at the Maanshan nuclear1007
power plant. For a grid and switchyard LOOP frequency of1008
1.86× 10−2 and 1.04× 10−2 per/year respectively, the case1009
study was analyzed on a 2.5-GHz, E5-2670 v2 Intel Xeon CPU.1010
A 5% coefficient of variation was imposed on the conditional1011
probability of SBO as the simulation convergence criterion. The1012
analysis took about 3 h, and the results yielded are summarized1013
Fig. 15. Composite frequency of first SBO exceedance.
in Table IV, Fig. 14, and Fig. 15. The probability of exceedance 1014
gives a measure of the likelihood of nonrecovery from the SBO 1015
within a given time. The composite frequency of exceedance is 1016
the sum of the frequencies of exceedance yielded by the two 1017
LOOP categories. 1018
As shown in Table IV, the probability of an SBO given a 1019
LOOP is almost the same for both LOOP categories. The slight 1020
difference is due to the fact that the GTG are unusable during 1021
switchyard centred LOOP. Their effect, however, is prominent in 1022
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Fig. 16. Comparison of composite frequencies of exceedance. (a) Composite frequencies of exceedance when a minimum of two powertrains are required for
power recovery; (b) Composite frequencies of exceedance when one power train is sufficientfor power recovery.
mitigating the second SBO. The nonrecovery probability from1023
an SBO, as shown in Fig 14, is expressed as the nonrecovery1024
likelihood as a function of time and number of safety buses.1025
The overall SBO risk at the plant is defined by the composite1026
frequency of exceedance, as shown in Fig. 15.1027
As a way of verifying the convergence of the simulation,1028
the product of p1 and the fraction of SBO at start-up, should1029
match the probability, p0 , of the emergency power system be-1030
ing unavailable at time 0. Bear in mind that GT-5 and the GTG1031
have no influence on p0 , as a result of the delays characteriz-1032
ing their start-up. Therefore, the emergency power system is1033
unavailable at start-up only if DG-A (or DG-B) is unavailable1034
due to test/maintenance and DG-B (or DG-A) fails to start or1035
both are not in test/maintenance but fail to start. If Utm is the1036
unavailability due to test/maintenance of DG-A and DG-B and1037
ps , their start-up failure probability, p0 is obtained as1038
p0 = Utm (ps + ps) + (1− Ua) p2s
p0 = 2Utmps + (1− Utm) p2s . (21)
Substituting the required values in (21), an error of 3.17% is1039
realized for grid LOOP and 4.7%, for switchyard LOOP. Since1040
the error in each case is not in excess of 5%, the convergence of1041
the simulation is verified.1042
Ensuring an enhanced risk insight, the system was reanalyzed1043
for three additional scenarios as follows.1044
1) Case 2: No delays in the start-up of DG-5. This implies,1045
the effects of human error are removed.1046
2) Case 3: GTG start-up is simultaneous with DG-A and1047
DG-B. The generators, however, are kept in warm standby1048
after start-up.1049
3) Case 4: A combination of Case 2 and Case 3.1050
Case 1 represents the scenario already analyzed, and the1051
results for the four cases are summarized in Figs. 16 to 181052
(please note the composite frequencies in Figs. 16(a) and (b) are1053
Fig. 17. Comparison of SBO frequencies.
expressed on a log-scale). We have used absolute, instead of 1054
conditional probabilities in Fig. 18, to ensure uniformity. 1055
The following risk insights are inferred by the outcome of the 1056
case study. 1057
1) As shown in Fig. 14, SBOs induced by switchyard fail- 1058
ures are more difficult to recover from and, therefore, con- 1059
tribute more to the overall SBO risk at the plant. In this 1060
light, feasible reliability improvement programs should be 1061
designed to ensure the high reliability of the switchyard. 1062
Such a reliability program should be complemented by an 1063
efficient repair policy to keep the nonrecovery probability 1064
low. 1065
2) The GTGs are the only difference between the recovery 1066
durations of grid and switchyard LOOP. These generators, 1067
therefore, are very instrumental to mitigating SBO risks 1068
at the plant, and their availability should be kept high. 1069
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Fig. 18. Comparison of second SBO probabilities.
3) Automating the start-up of DG-5 and initiating the start-1070
up of the GTG just after LOOP guarantees an improved1071
resilience to SBO, as endorsed by Figs. 16 to 18. However,1072
starting the GTG simultaneously with the EDG brings1073
with it additional costs, borne from fuel consumption and1074
maintenance. This decision, therefore, should be preceded1075
by a robust cost-benefit analysis. In fact, under economic1076
constraints, it is prudent to automate the start-up of DG-51077
only, as the difference between the outcomes yielded by1078
Case 2 and Case 4 is only just slight.1079
In this case study, we have ignored the explicit sensitivity and1080
importance analyses of the individual components, since these1081
quantities can be achieved even with the existing techniques.1082
V. CONCLUSION1083
SBO accidents, though a rare occurrence, can have devastat-1084
ing consequences on a nuclear power plant’s ability to achieve1085
and maintain safe shut down. Consequently, the plant’s capa-1086
bility to cope and recover from such occurrences makes a key1087
input to its probabilistic risk assessment model.1088
In this paper, we have proposed an intuitive simulation frame-1089
work to model a nuclear power plant’s recovery from SBO acci-1090
dents. The framework provides a simple means of defining the1091
complex interdependencies that often characterize the opera-1092
tion of practical engineering systems, and therefore, applicable1093
without unrealistic assumptions. This attribute, coupled with1094
its ability to intuitively tolerate the multistate behavior of the1095
system’s building block, distinguishes it from the existing ap-1096
proaches. Its applicability has been demonstrated by modeling1097
the SBO recovery of a pressurized water reactor, providing an1098
informed insight into its SBO risks. The proposed approach was1099
able to fully model the dynamic behavior of the power system1100
and provide valuable insights on the SBO risk at the plant. The1101
nonrecovery probability curve obtained, for instance, can be ab-1102
sorbed into the existing probabilistic risk assessment models,1103
Fig. 19. Structure of a three-component pipe network.
getting rid of laborious fault trees. Since this curve also depicts 1104
the unavailability of ac power, it can be directly compared with 1105
the reliability of the plant’s SBO coping mechanism, providing 1106
an easier means of determining the need for their reliability im- 1107
provement. It also helps ascertain the adequacy of the plant’s 1108
SBO recovery capability, without revisiting the entire model. 1109
A key desirable feature of the proposed framework is its wide 1110
applicability, even to nonnuclear applications. 1111
In spite of their well-documented limitations relative to the 1112
proposed framework, the existing static fault tree-based mod- 1113
els still possess desirable attributes that give them an edge in 1114
importance, sensitivity, and uncertainty analyses. With this in 1115
mind, the proposed framework has been developed with the 1116
view to complementing their applicability, instead of serving 1117
as an explicit replacement. We have, therefore, included a clear 1118
description of how its output can be incorporated into these 1119
models. The framework, in addition, has been implemented in 1120
the open-source uncertainty quantification toolbox developed 1121
at the Institute for Risk and Uncertainty (see [27] and [28]), 1122
thereby rendering it readily available. 1123
The multistate model and dependency matrices proposed cre- 1124
ate the foundation for the incorporation of additional dynamic 1125
considerations. Such considerations as the optimal number of 1126
maintenance teams on-site, EDG failure during cold standby, 1127
optimal inspection interval, and the availability of spares are 1128
a possibility. Efforts are underway to extend the framework to 1129
these considerations, other LOOP categories, and incorporate 1130
epistemic uncertainties. 1131
APPENDIX 1132
This section is introduced with the view to providing a de- 1133
tailed example of how the linear programing problem is formu- 1134
lated, stating the exact values of the relevant parameters. The 1135
goal is to enable readers to grasp, fully, the concept proposed in 1136
this paper, as well as provide a benchmark for validating their 1137
implementation of this concept. 1138
Consider the three-component pipeline shown in Fig. 19, 1139
adapted from [22]. A maximum of four tons of oil could 1140
be pumped from the source, Xin, to the output, Xout , where 1141
the demand is fixed at 3.5 tons. The state-space of each of 1142
the other components is shown, with the number beside each 1143
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Fig. 20. Network model of pipe network.
state denoting the capacity of the component in that state. The1144
equivalent graph model of the system is shown in Fig. 20. Notice1145
the two extra nodes, 1 and 5, representing the source and output,1146
respectively. The available information is sufficient to formulate1147
the linear programing problem and derive its parameters. The1148
first step is to define the adjacency matrix, since all the other1149
parameters depend on it. From Fig. 20, the adjacency matrix,1150
A, is obtained as1151
A =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
The next task is to deduce the edge and incidence matrices, e1152
and Γ, respectively. They are obtained thus1153
e =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 2
1 3
2 4
3 4
4 5
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ Γ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1 0 0 0
−1 0 1 0 0
0 −1 0 1 0
0 0 −1 −1 1
0 0 0 0 −1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
With A, e, and Γ known, the linear programing problem is1154
formulated as follows.1155
1) At time 0, all the components are in their best performance1156
state. The inequality constraint, therefore, is expressed as1157
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
X12
X13
X24
X34
X45
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ ≤
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
4.0
1.5
2
4
3.5
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
2) The equality constraint is expressed as1158
⎛
⎝−1 0 1 0 00 −1 0 1 0
0 0 −1 −1 1
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
X12
X13
X24
X34
X45
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎝ 00
0
⎞
⎠ .
3) The bounds on the flow through the edges are 1159
lb =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0
0
0
0
0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
ub =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1.5
2
1.5
2
3.5
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
4) The objective function is expressed as 1160
Ψ =
(−1 −1 0 0 0 )
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
X12
X13
X24
X34
X45
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
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